The Edward Snowden files’ revelation that the United States has been tapping the phones of top French, Mexican, Brazilian, and German politicians should not really surprise anyone, but that is not the real story. The “everyone does it” argument is meant to mitigate the offense, but is wrong on two counts. It is incorrect technically, as no other country has our capabilities. It also fails to take into account the political damage that occurs when a nation initiates large scale espionage operations directed against allied countries, such as France and Germany. The German and French public will rightly assume that Washington will engage in reckless behavior whenever it believes—rightly or wrongly—that its own security is somehow at stake, indicating that the transatlantic relationship only runs in one direction.
One can only assume that German Chancellor Angela Merkel is genuinely furious at having her cell phone conversations intercepted by the National Security Agency (NSA). The president’s claim of ignorance may not hold up, as the German media is reporting that Barack Obama was briefed on the operation three years ago. The Senate Intelligence Committee is likewise claiming that it was not aware of the operation, while intelligence chiefs have spoken up to suggest that the teltaps were done with the cooperation of European intelligence services. The White House has meanwhile circled its wagons, neglecting to include any apology for intelligence operations aimed at America’s allies in its damage control. Nor has it promised to cease and desist in the collection effort; quite the contrary, it is declaring only that it will “reexamine” the program or consider “constraints” on it.
Intelligence agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and NSA have two core functions. The first is to collect essential information that is not available publicly or through open sources, and the second is to analyze that information so it can be understood and used by policy makers. As the collection of intelligence is itself an act of espionage, tapping phones and recruiting sources being illegal in most countries, such operations should normally be undertaken only after being subjected to a rigorous risk versus gain analysis. Unfortunately, however, careful consideration of the potential downside of intelligence collection operations has not been the rule since 9/11. When the covert collection efforts are either revealed or produce a bad result, the unfortunate consequences are referred to as “blowback.”
Blowback can irreparably damage the ability of the United States to obtain crucial information in foreign environments that are poorly understood in Washington. The cultural divide that exists when operating away from home means that CIA and NSA frequently work overseas through a network of liaison contacts. This in theory limits their activity, but it broadens their ability to collect information that can only be plausibly obtained by a local organization with local capabilities. Though nearly everyone also operates clandestinely outside the parameters of the established relationships insofar as it is possible or expedient to do so, there is an awareness that being caught can cause grave damage to the liaison relationship. Because being exposed is nearly always very painful, such operations are normally limited to collection of critical information that the liaison partner would be unwilling to reveal.
So while it might be comforting to claim that “everyone does it” at least some of the time, and it may even be true that local spy agencies sometimes collaborated with NSA, the United States has a great deal to lose by spying on its friends. This is particularly true as Washington, uniquely, spies on everyone, all the time, even when there is no good reason for doing so. It has always done so, often just because it can, which professor Michael Brenner refers to as “technological determinism.” The technological juggernaut combined with bureaucratic inertia demanding that the intelligence agencies “do something” to validate their existence has driven the vast NSA operations that collect huge masses of largely indigestible and often contradictory information.
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